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Abstract
This case study provides an in-depth look into the campaign to retire an aging nuclear
power plant located in the southeast corner of Vermont. The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station (VY) began commercial operations in 1972 under a forty year operating license issued
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Opposition to the plant’s existence has been
unwavering and has increased in intensity since the sale of the plant in 2002. The Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC), a consortium of local and regional utilities, sold
VY to an out-of-state corporation owner known as Entergy. The company was quick to apply
for approvals from the state and federal governments, to increase the plant’s power production,
to store spent nuclear fuel on-site and for a twenty year license extension. Advocates were
unsuccessful at blocking the power up-rate and the construction of an on-site spent fuel storage
facility, but were successful in blocking the plant’s license extension.
Advocates new in order to be successful they must collaborate in an effort to pass
legislation that would bring the power of deciding VY’s fate to Vermont’s General Assembly
and ultimately the people. The decision was made to form a coalition… Safe Power Vermont.
In 2006, the coalition and its supporters won the passage of ACT 160, which empowered the
legislature to vote on VY’s continued operation based on issues related to reliability and
economics. The coalition was successful again when in 2010 the Vermont Senate voted not to
considered the plant for continued operation past March 2012. Currently, the legality of the
legislation is under scrutiny in a federal district court in a case brought by Entergy.
The case study narrative follows the arch of VY’s operational life and history while
tracking the evolution of the campaign by highlighting key moments that facilitated outcomes.
J. Unsicker’s “Advocacy Circles” Map is used as a method of organizing information and as a
lens to analyze the data. This is done in an effort to assist other advocates in succeeding in
similar movements across the United States. The research and prospective given here, has been
acquired from personal experience collaborating directly with local and regional advocacy
groups involved in the campaign, as well as independent research.
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Introduction
My practicum was spent gaining knowledge in the fields of policy advocacy and
renewable energy. I spent time working with the Safe Power Vermont coalition as an in intern
with the Vermont Public Interest Research Group (VPIRG) a member organization. VPIRG
collaborates directly with other advocacy organization, through the coalition, in their effort to
retire the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) on schedule in March 2012. As a
VPIRG graduate intern, I helped the Clean Energy Advocate and the field organizing team in
implementing various tactics aimed at raising awareness among constituents and mobilizing
them to take action. I conducted research into coalition targets and opponents, produced
informational materials and helped organize activists for action. I was fortunate to have
worked with the coalition during the January 2010 Senate vote, which denied the current owner
of the plant, Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee’s (ENVY), its request for a Certificate of
Public Good room the state. Under Vermont law, Entergy cannot operate the plant past the
original forty-year licensing period, which expires in March 2012. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) recently approved Entergy’s request for a twenty year license extension.
In most states the NRC is the only regulator of commercial nuclear power plants. But, in 2006
Vermont became the first state to pass legislation that enables the legislature to vote on whether
it is in the public’s interest to continue operating VY. The legality of the Act 160 and the
decision made by the Vermont Senate is currently being contested by Entergy in a federal
district court.
I was first introduced to the issue by Professor Jeff Unsicker1 while attending his
introductory course on Policy Advocacy in the fall of 2008. After learning the extent of the
plant’s physical deterioration, history of frequent failures and the mass of highly radioactive
waste being stored on-site, I was shocked to hear that the NRC was considering Entergy’s
application for a license extension. It seemed inevitable that VY would receive an extension
considering the NRC had never denied one. I grew up in central VT and attended high school
in Putney; only twenty miles north of the reactor. Never before had I considered the

1

SIT Graduate Institute in Brattleboro, VT
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implications of hosting a nuclear power plant and its impact on the ecological, social and
economic sustainability of the host region. I knew cleaner, safer energy alternative existed that
could be deployed locally using renewable sources. Operating VY beyond its designed
capacity and operational life increases the chance of a major accident occurring, which could
decimate the local ecology and economy. And, with no solution for disposing of the waste that
has been produced over the past forty years it is unconscionable to produce another twenty
years worth. The continued operation of VY exposes current and future generations to undue
risk.
I immediately wanted to get involved in the campaign. I had learned that a dedicated
network of local and regional advocacy groups had worked tirelessly to pass a key piece of
legislation that gave the power to determine VY’s fate to the state legislature via Act 160. I
began volunteering with the Vermont Citizens Action Network (VCAN), the lobbying arm of
the Citizens Awareness Network (CAN), in the Fall of 2008 helping the coalition in their
efforts to raise awareness among voters in key legislative districts throughout Vermont. I went
door-to-door delivering informational pamphlets, talking with constituents about the issues and
collecting voter signatures who supported the initiative. I was later given the opportunity to
work with Nuclear Free Vermont (NFV), a small grassroots organization, who in collaboration
with CAN, VCAN and Safe Power Vermont had acquired a grant with the primary goal of
winning the Act 160 vote. To achieve this, the coalition needed to gain enough constituent
support in priority districts to pressure those legislators who may be more apt to vote in favor of
retiring.
During my time at VPIRG I was offered a position as an installer with a regional
renewable energy company. For over a year and a half, I have been installing solar electric, and
hot water systems for residential and commercial customers. It has been a rewarding
experience to have a direct impact on increasing renewable energy supplies in Vermont.
Purpose of capstone
The purpose of this case study is to provide an in-depth look into the campaign to close
VY in order to gain a better understanding of advocacy and the process of policy change
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specific to energy issues in Vermont. It is done in an
attempt to assist other advocates in succeeding in
similar movements across the United States. The arch
of the narrative follows VY operational history while
tracking the evolution of the campaign, and the
coalition by highlighting key moments that helped in
facilitating successful outcomes. The research and
prospective given, has been acquired from both personal experiences collaborating with the
individuals and groups involved in the campaign, and through independent research and
analysis. As a method of organizing and interpreting the information I have utilized the
Unsicker’s “Advocacy Circles” Map. Above is a visual representation of the Advocacy Circles
Map, which has been adapted from materials provided by J. Unsicker from 2008 to 2010.
The map provides a frame work for analyzing the advocate role and effectiveness within
the advocacy context. As described by J. Unsicker, it is “… a simple way to visualize the
dynamic, iterative dimensions of the reality or territory of advocacy.”2 The advocates operate
within the political, strategic and policy circles, which are imbedded with the larger context.
Advocates represent the group of persons, a formal or informal organization, seeking to
influence one or more policy issues. To be effective, advocates must have or develop the
capacity to:
•
•
•
•
•

analyze and act in accordance with the larger context;
carry out policy research and analysis,
identify and navigate a political system composed of numerous different actors,
develop and carry out various approaches for influencing policy makers, and
monitor, evaluate and learn from all of the above.

The first four of those activities represented by the other circles. Advocates are at the nexus of
them all, linking them all together. The context circle represents the immediate politicaleconomic-cultural context at a specific moment or period in time. The three remaining
“arenas” or circles (Policy, Politics and Strategy) represent the areas that advocates are

2

Unsicker, 2010, pp. 12
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constantly analyzing and acting within or simply, the “what,” “who” and “how”. In contrast to
a map, the over-lapping circles suggest that there is ongoing activity in each arena and that
those activities continually interact and influence those in the other arenas.
In the Policy arena, advocates and other actors carry out research and/or less formal
forms of information gathering that result in the definition of a problem or set of problems,
their causes and one or more policy goals that are designed to address the cause(s) and solve the
problem(s). In the arena of Politics, there are formal and informal systems by which policies
are made, changed and implemented, as well as numerous actors who are engaged in this
system. The main actors are the targets (those policy makers who need to be influenced), allies,
opponents, and the general public. In the Strategy arena, the advocates plan and carry out
activities that they believe will help them influence targets and thus achieve their policy goals.
This includes (a) analyzing the political systems and actors, including themselves, and (b)
combining that knowledge with their policy goals to formulate intermediate and short term
objectives for specific strategies and tactics.
Context
The notion of an atom has existed for centuries, but only within the last one hundred
years have we begun to understand the enormous power contained in its tiny mass. In the years
proceeding and during World War II, most atomic research and development focused on
weapons creation. After the war, the United States government wanted to encourage the
development of nuclear technologies for peaceful civilian applications. In 1946, Congress
passed the first iteration of the Atomic Energy Act with the intent to regulate nuclear energy
development in the United States (U.S.) and manage the nuclear weapons technology it had
jointly developed with England and Canada during the war. The act mandated that nuclear
weapons development and nuclear power management would be regulated by a civilian agency
dubbed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). It was later amended in 1954 to include
increased support for the nuclear power industry.3

3

Atomic Energy Act of 1954

Page 9 of 43

By the mid-1950s, scientists had demonstrated that nuclear reactors could produce
reliable energy output, and in 1957the first commercial nuclear power plant was built in
Shippingport, Pennsylvania. In 1974 the Energy Reorganization Act was passed abolishing the
AEC and splitting its functions between two new agencies: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration - now the Department of
Energy (DOE). Today, the NRC regulates the nuclear power industry in the U.S., while the
DOE is responsible for overseeing the development and production of nuclear weapons, as well
as the promotion of nuclear power.
In 1982 the Nuclear Waste Policy Act established the US government’s responsibility to
provide a place for the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel,
as well as the generators’ responsibility to bear the costs of permanent disposal. The legislation
tasked the DOE with finding, constructing, operating and decommissioning a permanent
geological repository for the waste. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible
for setting public health and safety standards for release of radioactive materials from a
repository, and the NRC is tasked with communicating the regulations governing construction,
operation and closure to federal officials and the public. Currently, owners of nuclear reactors are
required to pay the costs of disposal through a fee paid by consumers of the power.
In 2002, under heavy opposition from local residents and other groups, construction
began on the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada; eighty miles northwest of
Las Vegas. Operations at the facility were effectively terminated with the passage of the 2011
federal budget, which defunded operations at the site. The closure was due to economic
constraints, as well as concerns over the long-term integrate of the facility and its impact on
public health. The DOE continues to look for an appropriate repository, but no timeline has been
given for when a repository with begin accepting radioactive waste.
Vermont Yankee – A History
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In 1966, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC)4 applied to the
AEC for a permit to build a nuclear reactor along the banks of the Connecticut River in
southeastern Vermont. The proposal came during the height of nuclear power expansion in the
U.S. Many projects faced stiff opposition from local advocacy organizations, concerned
citizens and officials. It sparked a national movement lead by anti-nuclear activists and
environmentalists who were concerned over the long-term effects of nuclear technologies. The
VYNPC faced similar opposition from local groups, but developers were able to thwarted
efforts to stop the project, and in 1967 construction began. Two years later, the VYNPC
applied for an operating license to operate the reactor, and on November 30, 1972 the Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Station, or Vermont Yankee (VY), began producing power for the New
England power grid with a forty year operating license from the AEC.
From 1972 to 2001 the plant operated reliable with few major incidents or issues. This
record of service began to deteriorate in 2002 when, Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC
(ENVY), a subsidiary of Entergy Nuclear Incorporated, purchased VY from the VYNPC.
Entergy created two subsidiaries, an owner ENVY and operator Entergy Nuclear Operation
(ENO) to limit the parent company’s liability exposure. Through the sale, ENVY received the
reactor complex, all nuclear fuel inventories and related site real estate. The sale included a
revenue sharing agreement (RSA) and a power purchasing agreement (PPA). Under the PPA,
three of the former owners, including two Vermont utilities5, buy a portion of the electricity
produced by VY at a set price; approximately 4.5 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh). The RSA
stipulates that fifty percent of the revenue generated from energy sales greater than a fixed
market price is shared among the signatories. Both contracts expire in 2012.
Entergy’s recent efforts to obtain new PPAs from Vermont utilities have failed and in
May 2011 Green Mountain Power (GMP), a former owner of VY and PPA/RSA contract
signatory, announced that it signed a PPA with NextEra Energy Resources LLC, owner of the

4

VYNPC was a consortium of eight utilities from the northeast: Central Vermont Public Service Corp. (35 percent);
Green Mountain Power Corp. (19 percent); New England Power Company (22.5 percent); Connecticut Light and
Power Co (9.5 - percent); Central Maine Power Co (4.0 percent); Public Service Company of New Hampshire (4.0
percent); Cambridge Electric Light Co (2.5 percent) and Western Massachusetts Electric Co (2.5 percent).
5
Central Vermont Public Service (CVPS) and Green Mountain Power (GMP)
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Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant in New Hampshire. The twenty-three year agreement is a fixedprice contract that adjusts with inflation.6 Entergy also assumed liability for managing the
decommissioning fund and the decommissioning of the plant upon its retirement.
Corporate Spin-off
In 2007 Entergy announced plans to “spin-off” six of their eleven reactors. The
company created two new firms: Enexus and EquaGen. Enexus would be the standalone
owner of the six reactors Entergy planned to “spin-off”, including the Pilgrim, James A.
FitzPatrick, Indian Point reactors 2 & 3, Palisades and Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant.
EquaGen, a new limited liability corporation, would take a fifty percent ownership of Enexus,
as well as Entergy’s five remaining reactors (Arkansas Nuclear One, Cooper, Grand Gulf River
Bend and Waterford 3). In-turn, Entergy would have fifty percent ownership of EquaGen
Nuclear LLC. In their application to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Entergy
listed twenty-one risks associated with the “spin-off” of these nuclear holdings. Summarized,
they represent acknowledgements by Entergy that Enexus would carry substantial debt and
such a low investment rating that it would negatively affect the company’s ability to obtain
financing. This would make it difficult to pay for plant upgrades and operating costs. They
also concede that a market for the stock did not yet exist and if one failed to develop the
company’s asset value would not be adequate; bring into question the company’s long-term
sustainability.7 In order to overcome these short-comings, Entergy promised lower prices on
power.
The proposal was heavily criticized for appearing as if Entergy executives and
shareholders were trying to isolate themselves from any financial or ethical responsibility
incumbent upon the owner and operator of the second largest fleet of nuclear reactors in the
U.S.8 Even so, in 2008 the proposal was approved by both the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and the NRC. The Michigan and Massachusetts state regulators, hosts to
6

Curran, 2011
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008
8
Exelon Nuclear Partners, a division of Exelon Generation, is the largest in the U.S. and third largest in the world;
operating seventeen reactors on ten different sites.
7
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the James A. Fitz Patrick and Pilgrim reactors respectively, also approved the proposed
restructuring; however, in February 2010 the Vermont Senate, under the authority of ACT 160,
voted not to review Entergy’s application for a Certificate of Public Good (CPG); killing the
initiative within the state. Later that year, the New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC)
rejected the proposal stating that it appeared financially unstable and not in the public interest.
This effectively ended Entergy’s plans for Enexus and EquaGen.

Entergy’s plan to “spin-

off” its reactor fleet helped advocates solidify Entergy’s image as an out-of-state corporate
owner that does not have the interests of Vermonters at heart.
Relicensing
On March 21, 2011 the NRC granted Entergy a twenty year extension to their federal
license to operate VY. Under current state law, Entergy will not be able to operate the plant past
March 2012 without a CPG. In April 2011, Entergy filed a federal suit against Vermont seeking
an injunction to prevent enforcement of Vermont law regarding VY’s license extension or any
regulating operations and on-site storage of spent fuel. Entergy also wants the court to issue a
judgment that federal law preempts Vermont (state) law.
The extension has also been contested by the Vermont Department of Public Service
(VDPS) and the New England Coalition (NEC) who filed suit against the NRC citing the
relicensing of VY is in violation of the Clean Water Act. By law, Entergy must have a license to
uptake and discharge water into the Connecticut River located adjacent to the plant. When the
NRC approved Entergy’s license extension it did so without the plant obtaining either a water
quality certificate from the EPA or a waiver from the state. The plant uses water from the river
for running and cooling the reactor. Water from the plant is often discharged back into the river
causing significant rises in water temperatures within the vicinity of the plant. This can have a
negative impact on the aquatic ecosystem.
Decommissioning
Over the past eight years Entergy has failed to fulfill its commitment to maintaining a
sufficient balance in the decommissioning fund, which was created by the previous owners to
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cover the costs of dismantling the facility. Upon purchase of VY in 2002, Entergy assumed the
responsibility for managing the fund. Since transfer of ownership, Entergy has contributed zero
dollars to the fund, which has resulted in a funding shortfall of over $500 million. Entergy has
repeatedly change its position in an attempt to evade the responsibility and now argue that they
have no direct responsibility for the fund. 9 As a result, the fund currently has less than half of
the $1 billion decommissioning is estimated to cost. If the fund balance is insufficient to cover
the cost of decommissioning, it is likely that Vermont ratepayers will have to pay the
difference.
Both ENVY, and ENO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
Vermont Public Service Board (VPSB), which regulates the activities and actions of utilities
within the state. As it pertained to decommissioning the MOU states that:
1. Decommissioning to be complete by March 31, 2022. 10
2. Decommissioning must meet standards outlined by the NRC
3. ENVY would provide additional funds or other acceptable financial assurances as needed to ensure that
funding will be sufficient to accomplish decommissioning
4. ENVY is to use its power to assure that the spent fuel is removed from the site in a reasonable manner
and as quickly as possible
5. ENVY is responsible for meeting all future decommissioning costs and any increases needed in the
contributions for decommissioning will not be passed on to Vermont consumers.11

In its approval of sale, the VPSB reiterated that the corporation had accepted the financial risks
associated with owning, operating and decommissioning VY and the corporation would bear
the burden alone. Vermont utilities and ratepayers would be shielded and any contributions
needed to ensure decommissioning upon shutdown would not be passed on to Vermont
consumers.12 Entergy has repeated stated its understanding of the decommissioning liability.
In a 2001 corporate news release, Entergy acknowledged that upon purchase of VY it would

9

Curry, 2008
State of Vermont Public Service Board, 2002
11
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, 2009
12
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, 2009
10
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take control of nuclear fuel inventories and assume liability for the decommissioning and the
fund. 13
Ten years of Entergy’s own 10-K filings with the SEC, from 2001 to 2009, also assert
acknowledgement of Entergy’s liability for funding decommissioning. These filings require the
Entergy to show all its assets and liabilities, which include its financial obligations relating to
all activities and costs associated with decommissioning VY. It was stated again in a 2002
corporate new release, “… [Entergy] would assume all financial and operational risks of
increases in operating and fuel costs, decommissioning costs, used fuel costs, nuclear waste
disposal costs, cost of any accidents at VY, costs of premature shutdowns and/or extended
outages.”14
Decommissioning involves three main activities: removing the industrial facilities,
transporting storing and safeguarding the spent fuel stored on-site, and finally, restoring the site
for future use. Removing the industrial facilities involves removing the reactor vessel and the
miles of radioactive piping, tanks, chambers, as well as tons of contaminated soil below and
adjacent to the reactor complex. Currently, components are dismantled and shipped to a
storage facility in Tennessee, Texas or Utah. The remainder of the non-radioactive areas such
as administrative buildings and workshops are recycled or deposited in local land-fills. In all,
over 670,000 cubic feet of low-level radioactive material and an estimated 135,000 cubic feet
of contaminated soil will be removed from the site.
All nuclear reactors slated for decommissioning require a “cooling-off” period to allow
some of the radiation to dissipate before work can safely begin. Due to the shortfall in
decommissioning funding, Entergy proposes to put VY into a condition called SAFESTOR.
SAFSTOR is one alternative to the prompt decommissioning of a retired nuclear power plant.
It enables the company to postpone decommissioning up to sixty years.15 This scenario

13

Entergy Corporation, 2001
Entergy Corporation, 2002
15
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008
14
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transfers the responsibility for decommissioning to future generations and does not capitalize
on the experience and skill of the existing workforce.
Decommissioning and restoring the VY site to a “green field” will likely be one of
Vermont’s largest industrial projects. Entergy’s estimates that the cost of decommissioning
will approach a billion dollars or more by 2012.16 The decommissioning process requires the
collaboration of nuclear safety and engineering experts to design and implement a
comprehensive safety and demolition plans. There will be an obvious need to employ qualified
contractors and labors to carry-out the various stages. TLG Services, Inc, a subsidiary of
Entergy, estimates that removing VY’s reactor facilities alone will cost over a half a billion
dollars and take one million working hours to complete. Entergy contracts with TLG Services,
to design decommissioning plans and implement them. In a 2007 report, Decommissioning
Cost Analysis for the VYNPS, TLG Services concluded that prompt decommissioning is the
most appropriate and cost-effective option for VY. The process would be more efficient and
cost effective if the company capitalized on the skills and abilities of the existing workforce.17
TLG Services also recognized that expedited clean-up ensures the responsibility for
decommissioning is not transferred to future generations.
Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage
A large part of the decommissioning involves safely removing the spent fuel from the
cooling pool, transporting it to a storage facility and safeguarding it against natural, and human
threats. Over 140 million pounds of spent nuclear fuel has been generated from commercial
reactors in the U.S. and an additional 4.4 million pounds is generated annually by operating
reactors. The majority of which will be radioactive for tens of thousands of years. 18 As of
2011, there is over 1.3 million pounds of spent fuel being stored on-site at VY. The majority,
1.1 million pounds, is stored in a cooling pool located several stories above and adjacent to the
nuclear reactor. This storage tank is positioned outside the reactor’s containment vessel, which

16

Vermont Department of Public Service, 2008
TLG Services, Inc., 2007
18
Alvarez, 2011, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2009; Congressional Research Service, 2004
17
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is a steel reinforced concrete structure that encases the reactor. It is designed to contain the
release of radiation and radioactive material in the event of a meltdown or explosion. The pool
at VY currently holds three times the amount of spent fuel stored at Fukushima Dai-Ichi’s
crippled Unit 4 reactor in Japan.19
The remainder of spent fuel at VY is stored on-site in dry casks at an Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installation (ISFI). Entergy obtained approval from both the state and NRC to
establish an ISFI in 2006. The company initiated the process to avoid exceeding the cooling
pool's licensed capacity; enabling the plant to continue operating. Plant managers began
transferring the older spent fuel assemblies from the pool into dry-casks in the spring of 2008.
A malfunctioning crane dropped the first loaded cask of spent fuel four inches to the concrete
floor of the refueling room. The accident was later attributed to the failure of a relay in an
overhead crane - the crane was reportedly tested in 1975 for only about 70% of the weight of a
fully loaded cask.
This method of storage is becoming more common at reactor sites throughout the U.S.
due to the absence of a federal repository. Currently, twenty of the nation’s 104 operating
reactors have ISFI storage facilities. In 2010 the federal government cancelled plans to
complete construction on a repository in Nevada at the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste
Repository. As a result, this nuclear waste must be safeguarded at VY and other sites across
the nation for the foreseeable future. 20 Multiple lawsuits seeking damages have been brought
against the federal government for failure to open a spent-fuel repository as required by the
1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
Timeline of Incidents
Over its thirty-nine year operating life, VY has experienced numerous incidents, many
occurring within the last decade. Many opponents point to the plant’s aging infrastructure and
the added stresses of an up-rate in power output authorized by state and federal officials in

19
20

Alvarez, 2011, pp. 1
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008
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2006. The approval allowed Entergy to increase power production by twenty percent – from
514 megawatts (MW) to 620 MW. 21 The rate of deterioration is exacerbated by corporate costcutting policies that result in deferred maintenance schedules and staff limitations. Since 2004,
there have been over fifty incidents at the plant. Some of the more notable events are described
in the following paragraphs in an effort to provide contextual detail.
In June of 2004 a fire broke out in one of the plant’s transformers causing an immediate
shutdown of reactor operations or SCRAM. In the same year, Entergy was cited by the NRC
for inadequacies in tracking spent fuel inventories when plant managers were unable to located
two irradiated fuel rods. They were found later at the bottom of the cooling pool. Inspectors
also discovered numerous cracks in the plant’s steam dryer. This component is not part of the
critical safety system, but its proper function is important to reliable reactor operation. Other
reactors have experienced problems with steam dryer cracking resulting in pieces breaking off
and falling into steam lines that lead to the turbine. These piece could disrupt the proper
function of components down the line. The steam dryer’s role is to reduce the moisture content
of the steam coming from the reactor. This increases the life of reactor components and
reduces the amount of radiation present in the steam as it exits the reactor. Additional crack
have been discovered during inspections in 2005 and 2008. After an inspection in July 2010,
the NRC states the deterioration of the steam dryer at VY is considered a critical indicator of
aging and stress at the plant.
One of the most significant events that has come to define the physical state of VY was
the collapse of a cooling tower in August of 2007, causing a fifty percent reduction in power
output. The collapse was a result of the degradation of the support structure. Contributing
factors were determined to be the failure of managers to look at industry wide problems,
inadequacies in routine inspections and financial constraints.22 The collapsed portion was
repaired, but in the Summer of 2008 a leak was discovered that later was found to be a result of

21

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006 & 2011

22

Gunderson, 2009
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inadequacies in the repairs performed on the collapses tower section. A followed up inspection
in Fall discovered that structural support brackets located in the cooling towers were inadequate
for the load and required reinforcement. These findings highlight the lack of oversight from
plant managers and the NRC, as well as the reactive nature of the plant’s maintenance policy.
Starting in 2009, plant managers begin detecting a series of leaks containing radioactive
water within the plant that require immediate repairs and reductions in the plant’s power output.
At one point the leak was purging as much as sixty gallons of highly radioactive water per
minute. The most significant, was discovered the following year on January 7th when Entergy
notified regulators that workers had detected elevated levels of radioactive tritium in a
groundwater monitoring well at the plant. It was later confirmed that underground piping was
among the possible sources of the contamination. This was significant due to an earlier
testimony given to the VPSB by Entergy executives, in which they stated that there were no
underground tanks or piping at the plant that could contained or carry radioactive water.
During the cleanup workers find another, more potent radioactive isotope in the soil near the
leak strontium-90; a byproduct of nuclear fission and linked to cancer and leukemia. Strontium90 has also been found in fish caught in the river adjacent to the plant.
An investigation was immediately launched to determine if there was an attempt
by Entergy executives to misled state officials. As a result, ENVY vice-president Jay
Thayer, the executive responsible for operations at VY, is relieved of his duties following
revelations of questionable statements he made to state officials in which he denied the
existence of underground pipes that were later found to be the source of radioactive leaks.
The NRC also found that Entergy is out of compliance with the minimum industrial
standards for groundwater protection at VY, citing failures regarding “leak detection
methods,” “enhancements to prevent spills or leaks from reaching groundwater,”
“preventive maintenance of equipment to minimize the potential of radioactive material,”
and failure to establish “a site-specific groundwater monitoring plan”.
In addition to structural and mechanical failures, Entergy has been cited numerous time
for failure to comply with federal regulations relating to maintenance and radioactive
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containment. In 2009 a maintenance supervisor is suspended after testing positive for alcohol
during a random fitness-for-duty test. It was the third known incident of a VY employee
testing positive for a controlled substance in the past two years.
This timeline highlights an ongoing concern that Entergy’s commitment to safety and
being forthright with the public, state and federal regulators and safety agencies. Other nuclear
plants around the country where radioactivity has been found in groundwater have seen their
costs of decommissioning climb significantly.
Vermont
Vermont (VT) is a relative small state both geographically and demographically. As of
2010, the state maintains a population of just over 625,000 inside a land area of roughly 9,000
square miles. It is a rural state where the majority of the population live in small, rural
communities many relying on Vermont’s natural resources to sustain their lives and
livelihoods. As a result, Vermont possesses a unique sociopolitical culture whose values are
rooted in the relationship citizens have with the natural environment. Conserving Vermont’s
distinctive landscape and resource base is at the center of many political debates and is a key
factor in charting Vermont’s social and economic development. This physical and emotional
bond has fostered a strong sense, and desire for personal freedom and independence. Even as
Vermonters fought, and fight for freedom and independence they understand that to protect
their freedoms they must work together for the common good of the larger community. This is
sentiment is captured in the state’s motto… freedom and unity.
Vermont is also known for its many firsts. It was the first state to join the original
thirteen colonies and in doing so, became the first state to outlaw slavery. It was the first state to
print a postage stamp and the first to provide its citizens with a state university. More recently, it
became the first state to enact legislation that empowered the state’s legislature to vote on the
continued operation of the VY. Act 160, passed on May 8, 2006, states that a nuclear energy
generating plant may only be operated in Vermont with the explicit approval of the General
Assembly after full, open and informed public deliberation and discussion with respect to
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pertinent factors, including the state’s need for power, the economics and environmental impacts
of long-term storage of nuclear waste, and choice of power sources among various alternatives.23
This legislation has become the cornerstone in the fight to close VY on schedule in 2012.
Advocates
The success of advocacy depends on the support and involvement of many people.
Consolidating and using this kind of citizen power depends on the willingness and capacity of
individuals and groups to collaborate to achieve common goals. One organizational tool used
to facilitate collaboration is the formation of coalitions and alliances. Their purpose is to bolster
advocacy efforts by consolidating the strengths and resources of diverse groups to acquire a
more powerful voice for invoking change. The Safe Power Vermont coalition has become a
powerful voice in the fight to ensure VY is retired in 2012. Thus far, the coalition has
succeeded in building and sustaining a large, diverse constituency that has had a direct impact
on legislative action and policy. This section provides an overview of the coalition’s, its
membership, its organizational structure, function and governance.
Safe Power Vermont – Vision & Mission
In her book, Coalitions and Partnerships in Community Health, Francis D. Butterfoss
identifies five essential characteristics of successful collaboration: 1) shared creation: joint
action for mutual benefit, 2) interdependence and reciprocity, 3) mutual authority and
accountability, 4) shared responsibility, risks, resources and rewards, and 5) inherent conflict
and dynamic tension (2007, pp. 27)
The Safe Power Vermont coalition grew out of a need for coordination and
collaboration among individuals and groups who opposed the continued operation of VY. The
union was catalyzed by the 2001 sale of VY to Entergy. The New England Coalition (NEC),
Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) and Nuclear Free Vermont (NFV) were the founding
members of the coalition. Over the years they have been joined by other state-wide and
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regional organizations who shared similar goals such as the Vermont Public Interest Research
Group (VPIRG), Vermont Citizens Action Network (VCAN), Toxics Action Center (TAC),
Sierra Club, the Vermont Yankee Decommissioning Alliance (VYDA) and Greenpeace. There
are many other unaffiliated yet well informed and active citizens that participate in actions
organized by one or all of the coalition members.
The coalition does not explicitly state its vision, but the prioritizing of goals and
objectives is driven by the essence of a vision, which can be imaged as an equitable Vermont
community that builds futures through the creation and implementation of policies that are
considerate of the ecological, social and economic needs of both human and natural
ecosystems. This definition is dynamic and may not be wholly agreed upon by all coalition
members over time and space. The coalition’s mission is stated in many forms and formats, but
is loosely interpreted as a desire to educate, organize and activate key constituencies in
Vermont to move public policy and build awareness among community members. Supporters
do share three main goals, which are 1) to retire VY is retired on schedule in 2012, 2) to ensure
that the decommissioning process beings promptly upon closure of the plant, and 3) to replace
the power with a combination of energy conservation, increased efficiency and thoughtful
application of renewable energy technologies within the state.
Vision and mission statements constitute the core of organizational stability and
effectiveness. The importance of such statements is discussed extensively in the literature. In
her book, F. Butterfoss defines a vision statement as an inspiring and uplifting image that is
understood and shared by members of a community. They are broad enough to be inclusive of
diverse viewpoints and can be easily communicated to new members (2007, p. 224). In
essence, a vision statement describes how a coalition, and its partners view themselves in the
advocacy context and their role in those processes contained within. A mission statement
compliments a vision statement by stating the fundamental reason for the organization’s
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existence, i.e. the purpose of collaboration.24 It describes WHAT a coalition, or organization is
going to do and WHY.
Safe Power Vermont - Organizational Structure and Governance
The coalition’s organizational structure and governance allows for autonomy and
equality among member organizations. Each organization is governed independent of the
coalition and often organize and/or participate in actions outside of the coalition’s strategic
mission. Chad Simmons, a long-time nuclear activist and coalition organizer, described the
coalition’s organizational structure “… as adaptive, highly flexible and fluid (personal
communication, May 16, 2009).” This relationship has shown to be beneficial during times of
conflict, when members may feel differently about the effectiveness, or practicality of a
particular strategy or tactic. For example, in 2009 elements of the coalition were passionate
about amending a resolution to various town’s ballots on Town Meeting Day, which asked
voters to disallow the continued operation of VY. Some member organizations felt that there
was a possibility that this tactic could work against the coalition’s strategy if the results were
not in favor of closing VY. Those organizations that opposed the ballot measure choose not to
participate directly in the organizing effort. The proponents implemented the ballot measure
and where highly successful. Out of the thirty-eight towns that voted on the issue, thirty-two
voted to close VY.25
The coalition generally meets once a month more frequently if an event or action is
planned, or if there is an abrupt change in the advocacy context such a policy or debate. At
least one representatives from each member organization tries to attend the meetings. Meetings
are run by one or more facilitators who organizes the agenda, prioritize topics for discussion
and keep participants on track. Minutes are recorded and distributed amongst members and
within the broader network. The responsibility for facilitating meetings and recording the
minutes is shared among member and changes periodically. Lead organizers and activists also
hold frequent meetings to update each other on current events, to solidify strategy and tactics,
24
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as well as to garner additional support. Constituents and other members of the public have
access to aggregated information on current events and campaign developments via the network
created among coalition members and their partners.
Coalition members are not bound by any formal agreements, rather they share an
informal understanding of the value of their partnership and the role it plays in advocating for
the public interest. The absence of a formal description of each member organizations role and
responsibilities can result in confusion, inequality and disillusionment. C. Simmons (personal
communication, May 16, 2009) noted that the lack of clarity in the roles, and to some extent
responsibilities of members resulted in an internal conflict. To some extent, this ambiguity is
mitigated by active and open communication among members and their partners, as well as the
ability of the leadership to resolve such conflicts justly and in a timely fashion. It is apparent
when review the coalition’s success that the organization is capable of analyze the
sociopolitical environment, adopt an effective strategy and adapt the appropriate tactics to
achieve desired outcomes.
Safe Power Vermont – Coalition Members
The NEC is the longest-standing member of the current network and fought against the
construction of VY and other nuclear power plants being constructed during the 1960s and
1970s. The NEC was pivotal in convincing the governor of Maine to request an independent
safety assessment of the Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, which ensured an open and
transparent review of the findings. Assessors found that complacency and the failure to
identify or promptly correct significant problems was apparent as demonstrated by previously
undiscovered deficiencies in the reactor cooling system. Assessors found other weaknesses
such as inadequacies in ventilation systems, documentation that lacked rigor and completeness
and inadequate emergency operation procedures. Assessors noted that throughout the
assessment process operators lacked a questioning attitude, which, in their judgment, “…was
not conducive to discovering equipment problems, but rather to accepting equipment
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performance.”26 The company acknowledged that economic pressures had limited their ability
to complete projects and employ technologies that would improve plant safety and
performance. This ultimately lead to the plant’s owners discontinuing plant operations in 1997;
fifteen years before its operating license expired.
CAN was formed in the wake of a near catastrophic accident at the Yankee Rowe
Nuclear Power Plant that occurred in 1992. The citizens of western Massachusetts banded
together to achieve a similar outcome as the NEC in Maine. CAN’s advocacy efforts
instrumental in the process by which the owners of the plant decided to discontinue operations.
CAN has since expanded into five states, including Vermont. The organization advocates for
intervention by the governments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire whose citizens share
the risks associated with being “downwind” of a nuclear reactor, but have no voice in
determining the fate of VY; often referring the situation to “radiation without representation”.
CAN created VCAN to act as its lobbying arm enabling the coalition to hire a paid
lobbyist who advocates directly to Vermont legislators and gains critical information regarding
their position on various issues such as VY. This information is used by coalition members to
rank legislators in order to target individual legislators for further advocacy efforts. Today,
CAN continues to capitalize on their strength as a grassroots organizer and its success using
direct action.
NFV was formed by a group of concerned citizens from Brattleboro, VT and other
communities within Windham County. Initially the group focused on getting a non-binding
resolution on the 2002 Town Meeting Day ballot in as many towns across Vermont as possible
in an attempt to raise awareness and demonstrate broad support. The resolution called for
citizens to vote in favor of retiring VY on schedule in 2012. The resolution won
overwhelmingly support from many of the local communities bolstering NFV’s effort to block
the sale of VY to the Entergy Corporation , approval of a 20% “up-rate” in power generation
and the approval of on-site radioactive waste storage in dry casks. Though the outcomes were
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less successful than had been hoped, the group was able to mobilize a large numbers of
influential community leaders and their constituents who’s influence resulted in various safety
and economic concessions including below market rates on the electricity sold to Vermont
consumers generated by VY.

NFV continues to use Town Meeting Day as a platform for

demonstrating public opposition and continue to win support from communities across
Vermont.
Safe Power Vermont & the Vermont Public Interest Research Group (VPIRG)
Founded in 1972, VPIRG is one of Vermont's leading non-profit advocacy
organizations. The organization is supported by over 20,000 members, private donors and
grant funding. Their stated mission, “..is to promote and protect the health of Vermont's
people, environment and locally-based economy by informing and mobilizing citizens
statewide.”27. In 1975, VPIRG established the Vermont Public Interest Research and Education
Fund (VPIREF) to facilitate community outreach and education. The organization focuses its
efforts on public policy issues that present opportunities to educate and activate key
constituencies by building awareness of the vital links existing between Vermont’s ecosystems,
communities and economy. This is done in hopes of invoking policy change that will lead the
state, nation and the world down a more sustainable path. Issue areas range from environment
protection and conservation, health care, consumer protection and good governance. The
organization has be instrumental in the passage of many state legislative acts dealing with these
issues.
VPIRG and the VPIREF are managed by a fifteen member Board of Trustees
administered by a President, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer. The Board is composed
of local professionals and business owners who are passionate about advocating for the public
interest. Collaboratively they prioritize issues and actions while managing the financial
sustainability of the organization. The organization employs nine staff members: an Executive
Director, Associate Director, Office Manager, Development Manager, Clean Energy Program

27

www.vpirg.org

Page 26 of 43

Director, Health Care Advocate, Environmental Health Advocate, Field Director and a Field
Associate. VPIRG also has an extensive network of volunteers and organizes a statewide doorto-door canvass each summer.
The Executive Director is responsible for implementing the Board’s short- and longterm goals, as well as supervising each advocates progress on initiatives relating to their
particular issue. The Executive Director is also engaged in promoting VPIRG’s and its
positions national and is also active in other advocacy organizations. The Associate Director is
responsible for supervising the day-to-day operations of VPIRG; working together with the
Office Manager and Development Manager to maintain a balanced budget and to ensure that at
the end of each fiscal year there are sufficient funds to cover the coming years expenses. This
is accomplished through advertising, direct and indirect communication with members and
donors, organized events and grant writing. The team is also responsible for maintaining
VPIRG’s extensive list of members and donors.
The Advocates work closely with the Field Director and Associate to design and
implement an effect strategy that will achieve positive outcomes using tactics which are
relevant to the advocacy context. While the Vermont Legislature is in session Advocates spend
a majority of their time meeting with legislators, testifying before various legislative
committees and holding public forums for constituents. The Field Director and Associate
coordinate actions with VPIRG’s network of allies to maximize the impact each has on
achieving the goal of each campaign. Staff members and volunteers characterize themselves as
advocates and organizers who are working to protect the public interest by supporting policies
that help to improve the quality of life in Vermont.
Recently, VPIRG has launched a Solar Communities initiative through a new entity
called VPIRG Energy with the simple goal of make installing solar electric and hot water
systems more affordable for Vermont homeowners.28 They have negotiated discounts with local
vendors, worked to bundle incentives reducing the upfront cost to customers and arranged for
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low interest financing. The organization has begun working with residents in over ten
communities throughout Vermont. Over time, they hope to be able to offer this opportunity to
more communities.
In collaboration with Safe Power Vermont and it allies, VPIRG is able to react quickly
to changes in policy debate. The organization’s ability to act quickly and appropriately within
the advocacy context can be attributed to good research and analysis, identifying the various
actors and navigating the political landscape, clear strategy and tactical precision, as well as an
effective method of monitoring and evaluation.
Policy
Proponents of VY believe the plant is vital to the local and regional economy. They
argue that the plant’s closure would have a considerable negative impact on Vermont’s
economy, which would be exacerbated locally due to the loss of employment, reduced
economic activity and decreased tax revenue. VY is one of the largest employers in Vermont
and is among the top five in Windham County with just over 500 employees. The loss of this
workforce would likely cause a decline in local home values, suppression in new home
construction and may lead to lay-off in other sectors of the economy increasing the burden on
local and state governments. Overall, the potential loss to the Vermont economy has been
estimated to be from $1.5 billion to $5.1 billion over the twenty year relicensing period. 29
These estimates do not take into account the labor required to decommission the plant and
clean-up the contaminated site. The entire reclamation process can take fifteen years or longer.
Decommissioning project at other reactors have required the retention of as much as fifty
percent of the workforce.30
Proponents also believe that nuclear energy is a “clean” source of energy due to its low
carbon emissions and any replacement power supply would be carbon intensive, such as coal
and oil, which would increase Vermont’s carbon footprint contributing to the anthropomorphic
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phenomena known as climate change. They rarely mention the tons of highly radioactive waste
that is currently being stored at VY and the reality of it remaining there into the foreseeable
future. Closure of VY would eliminate any further production of radioactive waste.
Opponents to the continued operation of VY believe Entergy has been negligent in
operating an aging nuclear power plant twenty percent above its designed generation capacity.
The practice has added additional stresses to the already weakened infrastructure, which has
been made event by recent events at the plant, i.e. cooling tower collapse, tritium leaks, etc.
The plant also does not meet current design safety standards and would not be built today. The
only reason to continue operating the plant is for short-term financial gain. Moreover, there is
no guarantee that the reactor will prove reliable and in these volatile times it is wiser to create a
diversified and decentralized energy infrastructure that relies more heavily on in-state power
generation.
Entergy continues to show itself as an entity that cannot be trusted to operate the plant
in the interest of Vermonters. The company has repeatedly blocked legal and legislative
attempts to hold it accountable for decommissioning funding, as well as other state and federal
such as water quality, fence-line radiation emissions and transparency of information. Entergy
executives have mislead legislators and have tried to dissolve themselves of any liability
through attempted sale and corporate restructuring. The concern is that Vermont ratepayers,
and possible taxpayers will have to cover the shortfall in funding, which may include long-term
payments for securing the nuclear waste stored in Vermont. Advocates also believe that
allowing the plant to continue operating past its design life unduly exposes current, and future
generations to the environmental and economic risks associated with operating such a facility
and storing the radioactive waste.
VY provides about 250 MW or roughly one-third of Vermont’s energy needs; the
remainder is sold on the wholesale electric market. The plant represents only two percent if the
total generation capacity on the New England power grid. Advocates believe the power can be
replaced through a diverse package of energy solutions that includes conservation, efficiency
and renewable energy. Policy initiative that target energy efficiency and renewable energy can
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generate significant environmental, social and economic benefit by generating long-term
employment opportunities, lowering energy costs and reducing the internal, and external
impacts of energy generation. Efficiency is known for being the cheapest source of "power"
costing, on average, 2-3 cents per kWh. Vermont utilities purchase power from VY at a rate
roughly fifty percent higher than efficiency and in 2012 this “cheap” rate expires with the PPA.
A 2007 report to the VDPS report showed that efficiency could reduce power consumption in
Vermont by 215 MW by 2015 (GDS Associates, Inc., pp. 1). This represents a significant
portion of the power purchased from VY.
Vermont is not the first state to face this situation. The citizens of Sacramento,
California voted to close the Rancho Seco reactor in 1988 after an incident that caused a sixty
percent loss in generation capacity; calling into question the plant’s reliability and economic
viability. The plant was closed in 1989 and the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD),
owners of the reactor, replaced the power with a diverse package of energy solutions including
small hydro, gas, solar, wind, efficiency and conservation. Rancho Seco was a large 1,000 MW
reactor. Vermont’s portion of Vermont Yankee is less than twenty-five percent of that. Much
of the skilled workforce at Rancho Seco was retained and employed in the decommissioning
process. In essence, VY does not offer a net benefit for Vermonters. Overtime, the relationship
with it owner, Entergy, will cost more than investing in sustainable energy alternatives and
efficiency.
The NRC has exclusive authority over the safety aspects of licensing nuclear reactors,
however, states retain jurisdiction over economic questions such as the need for additional
generation, the type of facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking and reliability.
Act 160
In 2006, Vermont became the first state to pass legislation empowering the state’s
General Assembly to regulate the nuclear power industry in the interest of the public good. Act
160 passed with resounding support in both the Vermont House (unanimous vote) and the
Senate (18-5), and was signed into law by the presiding Governor, Jim Douglas. Even Entergy
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supported the initiative quoted through a spokesperson as saying, "We commend the
Legislature, especially the House Natural Resources (and Energy) Committee, for putting a lot
of effort into drafting a bill that should serve the state well." Further stating that, "They
[Entergy] recognized the importance of fully addressing the question of Vermont's future
energy supplies."31
The law requires prior approval from the General Assembly to operate a nuclear power
plant and store spent nuclear fuel in the state. The law also limits the state’s authority to issues
relating to reliability and economic “best interests”. The state does not have jurisdiction over
plant safety, which is reserved by the NRC. The NRC has yet to deny a license extension and
has been criticized for being too close to the industry.32 Under the authority of Act 160, the
Vermont Senate voted twenty-six to four not to allow the VDPS to considered Entergy’s
application for a Certificate of Public good. Simultaneously, the federal government is pushing
to expand the fleet of nuclear reactors in the US and extend the life of existing reactors.

With

a commitment to renewables, conservation, and efficiency, Vermont could become a leader in
job creation based on alternative energy.
Today, the coalition is stilled focused on ensuring that VY is retired on schedule 2012
and decommissioning is initiated as soon as safely possible. They also continue to hold
Entergy liable for the cost of decommissioning VY and storing the spent fuel. And, are
committed to supporting the implementation of state energy policies that incentivize the use of
renewable energy technologies for both commercial and residential customers, pushes for
increases in energy efficiency and promotes the importance of energy conservation. Much of
the strategic and tactical planning is awaiting the federal court’s decision regarding Entergy’s
case against Vermont, but advocates continue to engage their supporters in the issue and work
to counteract Entergy’s influence among politicians and the public.
Politics
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The lines of authority between states and the federal government are, to a significant
extent, defined by the 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and relevant Supreme Court
cases. Legally, states are not considered a creation of the federal government; rather the states
compose the federal government; both operate within a system of parallel sovereignty. The
sovereignty of the federal government is strictly limited to the terms of the Constitution, whereas
state sovereignty is limited only by 1) the sovereignty and powers that states have transferred to
the federal government via the Constitution, and 2) the provisions of its own constitution, which
usually (but not always) sets certain parameters for the exercise of the state's sovereignty.33
When it comes to regulating nuclear power plants, the U.S. Supreme Court agrees that
both state and federal law applies to nuclear power. In the case of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. vs.
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (1983) the court held that a
state statute regulating economic aspects of nuclear power plants such as the need for additional
generating capacity, type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use and ratemaking was not
preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The case provides a framework that has
guided other cases involving preemption of federal authority.
Overlap between state and federal authority is present in all sectors of the economy. The
energy sector is no different. At the beginning of the 20th century electricity was generated and
deliverer to consumer by a number of independent electrical utilities, but in the mid-1900s utility
companies began to merge at a rapid pace and, overtime, the industry has come to be dominated
by a few regional and national monopolies. Between 1933 and 1936, the Roosevelt
administration’s “New Deal” policies brought federal regulation to the wholesale electric
market.34 Today, regulatory authority sits with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), which holds jurisdiction over interstate electricity sales, wholesale electric rates,
hydroelectric licensing, natural gas pricing, and oil pipeline rates.
Over the years, states have enacted legislation to regulate the activities and actions of
utilities operating locally through utility commissions, such as the Vermont Public Service Board
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(VPSB). Vermont has two entities that regulate the activities and actions of utilities operating
within the state: the VPSB and the Department of Public Service (VDPS). The VPSB is a quasijudicial board that supervises the rates, quality of service and overall financial management of
Vermont's public utilities. It also reviews the environmental and economic impacts of energy
purchases and facilities, the safety of hydroelectric dams, the financial aspects of nuclear plant
decommissioning and radioactive waste storage, and the rates paid to independent power
producers. The Board is tasked with providing an independent, fair and efficient means of
resolving public utility disputes and guiding the development of state utility policies and rules to
best serve the long-term interest of Vermont and its residents, as defined in Title 30 VSA §3 and
§9.
The VDPS is an agency within the executive branch of Vermont state government.
The Departments role is to represent the public interest in matters regarding energy,
telecommunications, water and wastewater. The department achieve this by: 1)
representing the public interest in utility cases before the VPSB, federal regulatory agencies,
and state and federal courts, 2) providing long range planning for the state's energy and
telecommunications needs, 3) ensures benefits are shared among ratepayers, 4) promoting
energy efficiency, 5) administering federal energy programs, 6) resolving utility customer
complaints, 7) informing the public about utility-related matters, and 8) making and
administering contracts for the purchase of power on behalf of the state. As the public's
advocate, VDPS is a separate agency from the VPSB.
Both houses of the Vermont legislature are responsible for overseeing energy
development and economic sustainability. Each have their respective committees discuss
and draft policy. The coalition has used these committee to their advantage and employs a
two prong approach to advocacy. On the one hand they advocate directly to legislature and
its committees while raising awareness and building a constituency at the grassroots level.
They direct their advocating power at:
o State Legislators
 Speaker of the House
 Senate President/Pro Tem/Governor
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 Natural Resource & Energy Committees
 Economic Development Committees
o The Public
o Local Business
The coalition allies itself with:
Legislators & state officials
Local Business
Local Media
Local Communities
 Town Meeting Votes – 2009 & 2010
o Voters
o Other advocacy organizations

o
o
o
o

Strategy
A well planned strategy acts as a road map that keeps advocates and activists on track
through the chaos of a changing sociopolitical environment. The strategy helps organizers: 1)
remain focused on the objective(s), 2) undeterred by their opponents attempts to block change,
3) keeps them steady in their message and 4) unifies their allies. An effective strategy is
designed around short-term objectives that are clear, specific and attainable, which relate
directly to the long-term goal(s) of the campaign. A strategy requires advocates to identify
their target(s) and how they can be influenced.
The coalition’s strategy is guided by four core beliefs: 1) Act 160 remains the “best
opportunity” to close VY, 2) legal action taken by the coalition members against government
agencies such as the NRC and the VTDPS and Entergy continue to be fruitful in delaying the
process to the advantage of the advocates 3) public outreach and direct action have effectively
raised public awareness, influenced public opinion, pressured policy makers and Entergy
officials, and helped in mobilizing a powerful constituency; and 4) the use of media has been an
effective tool at raising awareness and influencing key stakeholders in both the social and
political arenas.
The passage of Act 160 was a turning point in the movement and solidified the
coalition’s purpose. To achieve this success advocates took the time to carefully craft its
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message. Rather than make the bill a pro- or anti-nuclear power vote, in their literature and
meetings with legislators, advocates spoke about “good governance” and the responsibility of
the legislature for “due diligence” on a critical issue facing the future of the state. They argued
that such decisions should be made “in Vermont by Vermonters”; not by the NRC or an out-ofstate corporate owner like Entergy. This struck at the heart of Vermont values and helped to
garner support from legislators and their constituents.
Coalition leaders and advocates worked closely with supportive legislators to amend the
bill; mandating studies of the economic, health and environmental impact of extending VY’s
operations. The law required the state to hold public hearings periodically throughout the
review process. In the end, with no hope of defeating the bill, the oppositional leadership
supported the initiative as a good governance bill.
Districts are targeted and prioritized based on information obtained directly from
legislators and/or their constituents. This information is used to rank officials in terms of their
relative position on a particular issue. For example, if Representative X supports one of the
coalition’s initiatives they would receive a lower ranking and their district would be less of a
priority. Organizing efforts have been focused mainly in those districts whose legislators are
unsure of their position or not yet committed to one. The primary goal of organizing in targeted
districts is to build a constituency through awareness raising and inspire them to act in their
own interest. This strategy has been effective at mobilize constituents and directly impacts the
political positions legislators take.
Following the impact studies and public engagement processes, advocates began push
for a legislative vote on the issue. The collation’s leadership, together with their allies in the
legislature discussed the best method of introducing the issue into the General Assembly and in
which house would they be most successful. Ultimately, it was decided to introduced the
resolution into the Senate Committee on Natural Resources and Energy as a resolution to keep
the VPSB from reviewing Entergy’s application for a CPG. The resolution won overwhelming
support from the majority of Vermont’s Senators and their constituents. The decision to force
the vote in the Senate as opposed to the House of Representative was based on simple numbers.
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Vermont has thirty Senate seats and 150 Representatives; coalition leaders realized that they
would have a greater impact by concentrating their resources on fewer targets. Advocates had
also gained the support of key Senators, including the Senate President, who held sway over the
more progressive elements within the caucus.
Since the 2010 Senate vote, coalition members have continued to share in the
responsibility of organizing constituency in key legislative districts throughout Vermont.
While the coalition applies pressure from the bottom through its grassroots organizers and
activist, it also employs a lobbyist to communicate directly with key legislators This has been a
very effective method of gathering information that has been helpful in determining tactics and
timing. The coalition has organized numerous protests and rallies throughout the state. The
coalition has also been proactive in arranging public forums where constituents can discuss the
issues with their representatives in a “town hall” style meeting and has coordinated numerous
events that showcase experts in related fields who speak on the issues and their impacts.
Tactics
In the world of community organizing and policy advocacy, tactics means doing what
you can with what you have. The premise of tactics is to develop a mechanism that will
maintain a constant pressure on the opposition or target. A good tactic is directed, clearly
identifies or singles out the target to constituents, personalizes the target by humanizing public
and private institutions and lastly, polarizes the target using socio-cultural norms to stigmatize
behavior. A successful tactic is also one that supporters are willing, and able to do, can be
deployed quickly and sustained over a long period of time. Not only is pressure essential to
compel the establishment to make its initial concessions, but the pressure must be maintained to
make the establishment deliver.35
Having a clear and poignant message is an essential element in successful deploying
campaign tactics. The message must strict at the core values and beliefs that each person holds.
The message must be framed in such a way as to impassion a sense of urgency and a need for
35

Alinsky, 1971, pp. 142

Page 36 of 43

action. The framing process entails narrowing research down to the most salient, important
points. A frame can be defined as a organizing principle that is socially shared and persistent
over time that work symbolically to bring meaningfully structure to the world around us.36
Frames can be defined using three levels of frames. Level one frames focus on big ideas such as
freedom, justice, community, success, prevention, responsibility and sovereignty. Level two
frames present issue-types like the environment, health, safety, climate change, reliability and
the economy. Level three frames speak to the specific issue(s); for example, nuclear waste
storage, job development, state revenue generation and renewable energy.
The message is as important as the messenger. Picking the right person and/or forum
affects how the message is heard. Individuals earn credibility based on how well they
communicate. Thorough research, command of the facts and accuracy is what distinguishes an
effect . “The best strategy for change is to have public opinion on your side. That, more than
clever tactics, is what wins advocacy efforts and protects them (Schultz, 2002, pp. 82).”
Messages





Major safety concerns related to the aging nuclear facility
No viable system for disposal of nuclear waste (stored on-site)
Local environmental contamination due to leakage of affluent from the facility
Inadequate emergency evacuation plan in the event of a radiological release
Communicating the message in a bold and compelling way, will help make the issues

more meaningful and applicable to Vermont citizens. That is why framing a message is crucial.
Vermonters are divided on the issue of nuclear power and VY. Voters see VY as
creating good paying jobs and an important source of revenue for the local economy. The
coalition has realized that they cannot win this argument, even by talking about the jobs that
will be created moving to clean energy economy. Instead, the coalition pivots back to its core
message - closing the plant as scheduled is the safe and responsible thing to do. Entergy’s
position is that it is, “committed to keeping Vermont’s environment strong and healthy” and
producing “pollution-free energy” that contributes to the state’s low carbon footprint.
36

Frameworks Institute, 2011, pp. 5
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Advocates responded by highlighting the not so clean aspects of VY such as the radioactive
waste and underground tritium leaks.
Messengers
 Advocacy groups
o New England Coalition (est. 1960s)
o Citizens Awareness Network (est. 1992)
o Nuclear Free Vermont by 2012
o Vermont Public Interest Research Group
o Toxics Action Center
o Conservation Law Foundation
o Vermonters for a Clean Environment
 Vermont legislators and other local officials
 Citizens
Taking Action







Efforts made to try and stop the construction of VY
Creating ballot initiatives on Town Meeting Days
Blocking the sale of VY
Bring attention to the issue regionally and nationally
Organizing displays of civil disobedience, i.e. protests
Lobbying the Vermont legislator and local representatives

Evaluation & Learning
Reflecting upon my research and experience has enabled me to identify some of the
strengths and weakness of the coalition, as well as to offer a perspective on future opportunities
and potential threats. Using a SWOT analysis, I am able to present my findings in a more clear
and concise framework. The framework is helpful in illustrating where the coalition has been,
where it is at and where it may go in the future.
Strengths








Strong internal and external networks
Large constituency
Committed volunteer base
Adaptability & Flexibility
Knowledge base of leadership & staff
Experience of leadership & staff
Out-of-state support

Weaknesses





Monitoring & Evaluation
Lacking continuity of leadership
Limits of technology as a
communication tool
Lack of organizational diversity
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Opportunities






Creating alliances with labor
organization, institutes of education and
small business groups
Deepening out-of-state support
Monitoring & Evaluation
Increase organizational diversity

Threats






Membership fatigue
Funding
Internal conflict
Future verdict
Lack of organizational diversity

The analysis identified opportunities for organizational growth and development, as
well as identified potential threats to stability of the organization and its sustainability. The
research identified five key recommendations that may need consideration as the coalition
moves forward in its efforts to win this precedent setting vote. Below are listed the key
recommendations:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Revisit the vision and mission
Solidify organizational framework (roles & responsibilities)
Seek partnerships with key stakeholder groups
Formal resource sharing agreements (MOU’s)
Look at “time banking” as an incentive for volunteer participation
This moment provides a good opportunity for coalition members to re-evaluate the

function and functionality of the organization. roles and responsibilities, also must be clarified
to avoid internal conflict and increase efficiency within the coalition. The coalition must begin
to seek partnership with key stakeholder groups such as labor organizations, educational
institutions and small business groups. These three stakeholder groups are essential in VT’s
energy transition. Establishing memorandums of understanding (MOU”S) between member
organizations can stream line resource sharing and ensure that all parties are contributing to the
campaign equally. Lastly, to increase the volunteer base there may be a need to provide
incentives. “Time banking” is a method that allows an individual to “bank” their time spent
working for the campaign and use it at a later date to elicit help from another individual in the
in the time banking system. This could be an effective way of garnering the support needed to
sustain the campaign.
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Vermont is at a crossroads. Vermont can lead the way toward future innovation or not.
Vermonters have an opportunity to lead the way and set the tone for clean, safe energy for
generations to come.
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